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Abstract 
 
Tackling the problem of ecosystem services degradation is an important policy 
challenge.  Different types of economic instruments have been employed by conservation 
agencies to meet this challenge. Notable among them are Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) schemes that pay private landowners to change land uses to pro-environmental ones on 
their properties. This paper focuses on a PES scheme – an auction for the cost-efficient 
disbursal of government funds for selection of spatially contiguous land management 
projects. The auction is structured as an iterative descending price auction where every bid is 
evaluated on the basis of a scoring metric – a benefit cost ratio. The ecological effectiveness 
and economic efficiency of the auction is tested with data generated from lab experiments. 
These experiments use the information available to the subjects about the spatial goal as the 
treatment variable. Analysis indicates that the information reduces the cost-efficiency of the 
auction. Experience with bidding also has a negative impact on auction efficiency. The study 
also provides an analysis of the behavior of winners and losers at the final auction outcome as 
well as during the entire lifetime of the auction. Winners and losers are found to have 
significantly different behavior in this analysis. Behavior is also found to be significantly 
affected by the treatments as well.   
 
Key Words: Conservation Auctions, experiments Ecosystem Services, Spatial Contiguity 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Conservation friendly land uses on agricultural landscapes can deliver a variety of 
ecosystem services such as habitat and biodiversity protection benefits. However as most 
agricultural land is privately owned,
1
farmers will require financial compensation to 
implement the land use changes. Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes has come 
to be routinely implemented by government agencies to disburse funds to enable these 
changes.  Besides this ecological objective, cost-effectiveness of PES schemes is also an 
important objective as well since conservation budgets are capped. Additionally the regulator 
does not possess complete information about the magnitude of the costs farmers have to incur 
and for which they will require payments. Thus auctions have become prevalent in the market 
for pro-conservation land uses between farmers and the regulator for ecosystem services 
delivery. Notable of these auction based PES schemes is the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) in the US (Kirwan et al. 2005). Since 1985, the CRP has disbursed nearly $26 billion 
(Kirwan et al. 2005) to preserve approximately 1.8 million acres of wetlands and retire 36.8 
million acres of farmland to reduce soil erosion. Bids in the CRP auction represent the 
compensation farmers are willing to accept to change existing land uses to pro-ecosystem 
services ones. These bids are evaluated and ranked in descending order on the basis of a 
benefit-cost scoring metric termed the Environmental Benefit Index (EBI). Then starting 
from the top, bids with the highest scores are selected and funds are disbursed till the 
program budget is exhausted. Given the structure of the scoring metric, every participant 
landowners finds it in their best interest to submit bids closer to their costs to improve their 
chances of winning. Thus in theory, the auction is cost revealing and improves the costs 
efficiency of the PES scheme. The structure of the CRP has been adopted by conservation 
                                                     
1
 The US Fish and Wildlife Services reported in 1997 that 80% of all species listed as endangered in the United 
States were located on private lands (GAO 1994). Similarly, in Australia 99% of all endangered ecosystems and 
97% of all concerned ecosystems are located on private lands (Rolfe et al. 2009). 
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agencies in Australia under the Bush Tender pilot (Stoneham et al. 2003) and the Auction for 
Landscape Recovery pilot (Gole et al. 2005). 
A key aspect of conservation procurement that has received limited attention is that 
conservation friendly land uses often deliver greater biodiversity and habitat protection 
benefits (Willis 1979, Bartelt et al. 2010) if they are located on spatially adjacent properties 
with connections between them (Margules and Pressey 2000).  One approach to spatially 
aligning land uses across multiple private properties is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) 
subsidy proposed by Parkhurst and Shogren (2002, 2007). By rewarding similar land uses on 
adjacent parcels, the AB provides economic incentives for the creation of non-fragmented 
land use patterns on the landscape. However being a uniform payment scheme, AB based 
policies will not be cost effective. The extant CRP auction has not given attention to the 
spatial objective as well. This policy gap has initiated research on auctions which target the 
spatial goal (Rolfe et al. 2005 and Reeson et al. 2010). These studies involve experimental 
analyses of various auction formats which are explicitly designed to cost-efficiently select 
spatially adjacent bids. Rolfe et al. consider artefactual field experiments with Australian 
landowners using iterative and sealed bid auctions. The iterative format incorporates limited 
information feedback about auction results between iterations and a bid revision rule.  Under 
the sealed bid format subjects bid after communicating with each other.  Their experimental 
data suggests that the iterative format is more cost efficient than the sealed bid one as 
communication prior to bid submission exacerbates rent seeking. This result lines up with 
anecdotal evidence on cost savings to the tone of nearly $820,000 in Fiscal Year 2006 
through a two-round auction pilot under the Wetland Reserve Program (USDA 2009). 
Reeson et al. (2010) consider a lab study on an iterative auction with limited information 
feedback about auction results as well.  They analyze the impact of a bid revision rule and 
presence of the information about the maximum number of iterations on rent seeking. Their 
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experiments suggest that absence of bid revision possibilities and the presence of information 
about the maximum number of rounds have a positive impact on auction efficiency.   
 In this paper, we adopt a similar research agenda. We examine the economic 
performance of an iterative auction in purchasing pro-conservation land use on spatially 
adjacent projects in a laboratory environment. Our conservation auction considers a full 
information feedback about auction results at the end of every iteration to all agents who are 
arranged in a circle with two neighbors each. We also modify the scoring metric to 
incorporate the spatial objective into the bid selection process. Given the experimental 
environment we are able to evaluate the impact of changing the information available to an 
agent during the experiment on auction performance and bidding. We introduce this 
information treatment by notifying subjects in few sessions about the format of the scoring 
metric which reflects an improved likelihood of selection if one or both of a subject's 
neighbors are selected.  Besides evaluating auction performance, we present an analysis of 
bidding behavior during the entire lifetime of the auction as well as at the final allocation 
where the auction terminates.  Our analysis indicates that information and sustained 
experience with bidding has a negative impact on the economic performance of the 
conservation auction. We also find significant behavioral differences between winning and 
losing bidders both during the auction and at the end of the same. We elaborate on these 
results below.  
  
Section 2:The Conservation Auction  
Let            be the set of N participants in the auction. Each participant has one 
project. They submit bids which represent the amount of money they are willing to accept for 
the conservation projects. For simplicity we assume that every bidder submits a single bid so 
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that the total number of bids is equal to the number of participants.  Let             
represent a vector of bids.  Every winning bidder receives the value of their bid. Let   
       be the vector defining an allocation of winning and losing bidders. Every element 
     in x represents a winner   and an element      represents a losing bidder.  
The auctioneer has information about both the intrinsic ecological benefits from 
conservation land uses from the projects and the benefits generated when any two spatially 
adjacent properties are placed in the conservation program. Let vector           
represent the intrinsic benefits and constant   represent the benefits from selecting projects 
adjacent to each other.  Then depending upon the type of spatial arrangement of projects we 
obtain different formulations for the environmental value function.  For this study we 
consider projects arranged around a circle so that the value function can be represented as  
 
      ∑     
 
      ∑       
   
                          (1)                                                   
 
 We consider an iterative auction model where             represents the rounds 
and T the maximum possible rounds or iterations. In each round  , bidders submit a single 
bid. The auctioneer then selects the provisionally winning allocation   
  on the basis of a 
scoring metric that has a benefit cost format similar to the EBI. This metric evaluates 
combinations of projects where the benefit of every individual project is the sum of intrinsic 
and spatial benefit if neighboring projects are selected. Any project has a higher score and 
greater likelihood of selection if its neighbors have been selected.    The format of the metric 
for the     bidder is given by expression (2) as  
       
                   
  
 
 (2) 
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The optimization problem to select a value of    given the fixed budget M for players 
arranged around a circular landscape is then the following 
 
   
  
 
∑
                          
   
   
   
 
                      
   
 
                  
   
 
                                            Subject to ∑         
 
                                                      (3) 
 
 Expression (3) represents a knapsack problem (Kellerer et al. 2004) and we use a 
greedy algorithm to obtain the value of    
 .  This algorithm is a local optima generating 
algorithm. It starts with an initial set of winning bidders and replaces them with other non-
selected bids until   
  is obtained. In this optimization exercise, bids for spatially adjacent 
projects receive a higher score and hence have a greater likelihood of selection. Once   
  is 
determined it is announced to the bidders and the auction proceeds to round       where 
the optimization exercise is repeated and       
 is determined. This process continues till one 
or both of the following stopping rules are satisfied.  
 
1.  ̅      where  ̅ represents the minimum number of rounds.  
2. Value of the objective function is same between consecutive rounds.  
 
 Condition 1 implies that the auction has to go through a minimum of  ̅ iterations 
before ending in order to ensure that bidders understand how to bid. Condition II signifies 
that for a round   to be final, the winning score between rounds    and       should be 
equal. If this is not the case, then the auction proceeds to the next round. The second 
condition ensures that subjects don't try to prematurely end the auction by submitting a high 
bid that increases the score. If this were to happen, then losing bidders would lower their bids 
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in the next round to and increase the score associated with the winning allocation so that the 
auction would be extended by another round. If for any round  ̅      the above conditions 
hold then the auction ends.  Else the auction repeats through all the T rounds.  In our auction, 
the activity rule
2
 is implicit within the auction procedure.  Bids in any round are restricted to 
be positive and less than or equal to the past round’s bids. Thus if a bidder does not place a 
bid, then the value of their bid for that round becomes zero. Since bids are decreasing 
between rounds, a zero bid implies that bidders essentially lose the opportunity to participate 
since they can’t lower their bids anymore. Thus waiting is dis-incentivized.  
 The presence of a budget constraint and absence of set number of projects to be 
procured makes the strategic environment and Nash equilibria of a conservation auction 
different from standard procurement auctions. Outlining the features of the Nash equilibrium 
are important. We however abstract from this traditional approach and employ the concept of 
stability of an equilibrium outcome to identify some theoretical features of winning and 
losing bidders at allocation that can be supported by the budget when the auction terminates. 
These features identify the scenario where bidders don’t have incentive to change their 
behavior. Using them we select auction parameters for our experiments. A stable allocation 
   has the following properties.   
i)           such that   
            
   . This condition implies that for 
all participants who are not part of the winning group, bids are equal to costs. 
As a result they are unable to reduce their bids to improve their likelihood of 
winning any further. 
                                                     
2
 In iterative auctions, often participants may only observe the outcome for the first few rounds without bidding 
to obtain information about winners and their bids (if revealed) on the basis of which they bid in future rounds. 
Such waiting prolongs the auction and provides the bidders an opportunity to game it. An activity rule avoids 
this gaming situation by forcing all bidders to bid in a round to preserve their eligibility to bid in future rounds 
be able to bid in subsequent rounds. Activity rules have been used in the FCC auctions (Plott 1997), and 
airwaves auctions (McAfee and McMillan 1996). 
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ii)           such that   
            
     and     
    
    
          
where       
     
  . This condition signifies that winners' bids are very near 
their costs and they don't have any incentive to submit higher bids to earn 
more rents as that may cause them to be not selected in the next round.   
Section 3: Experimental Design   
We devote this section to the description of different aspects of our experimental design. This 
includes a discussion on our information treatment, the metrics to evaluate auction performance and 
choice of auction parameters. We conclude this section with a description of the experimental 
procedures.  
Section 3.1: The Information Treatment 
 In this article, we are interested in identifying key features of the strategic 
environment which can influence auction efficiency. One such feature is the information 
content of the auction. The experimental method provides us the opportunity to pursue this 
goal. We implement the information treatment by notifying subjects in some sessions about 
the spatial objective of the auctioneer while suppressing this information in other sessions. 
Our rational for this treatment choice is that conservation auctions are typically large 
government run auctions with many participants where transparency of auction goals may be 
a key political requirement. Moreover inclusion of a spatial objective may contribute to 
cognitive complexity of farmers who are the major participants in these auctions. Hence 
making more information available to the participants may be an effective way of achieving 
the ecological objective. Yet the study on an iterative conservation auction by Cason et al. 
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(2003) finds that higher information content of the strategic environment reduces both 
economic and ecological performance. They find that when subjects know the value of the 
environmental benefits associated with their projects, rent seeking is intensified and both the 
economic and ecological performance of the auction relative to the baseline no-information 
scenario is reduced. Thus there is a trade-off between information revelation and auction 
performance. In this paper we investigate whether the negative impact of information is a 
phenomenon endemic to iterative conservation auctions. We implement our information 
treatment differently from Cason et al.  In our treatment sessions termed SCORE subjects 
receive information about the format of the scoring metric given in expression (2) which 
declares the spatial target.
3
 This information is suppressed in the baseline sessions termed 
NO-SCORE. The bits of information common to subjects in all sessions include knowledge 
about their own costs, the total budget and total number of participants in the session.  . In 
keeping with the transparency objective, we include full information feedback about auction 
results at the end of every round of the auction. The feedback information includes the 
identity of winners, the value of the projects’ scores and submitted bids.  
Section 3.2: Auction Performance Metrics 
Our auction performance metrics are similar to those developed in Cason et al. (2003) 
and measures both the economic efficiency and ecological effectiveness of the iterative 
spatial auction. These metrics are constructed on the basis of the allocation that would be 
chosen in the absence of asymmetric information when bids equal cost. Let this allocation be 
denoted by     . Given this reference point, the ecological effectiveness (EE) of the auction 
                                                     
3
Rolfe et al. have conducted artefactual field experiments where farmers receive information about the format of 
the metric. They however don’t evaluate the impact of providing this information on auction performance.  
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at a stable allocation    is measured as the ratio of environmental benefits from     and  
    . Using expression (1) we can define EE as  
 
             
     
       
                          (4) 
 
 The value of EE indicates the impact of asymmetric information on ecological 
performance.  Closer the value of EE to 1, better is the capacity of the auction to achieve the 
ecological objective in the presence of asymmetric information relative to the full information 
outcome.  A value of 1 (when          indicates that the auction is successful in selecting 
the allocation that would be achieved in the absence of asymmetric information. Yet the 
ecologically effective outcome is possible even if bids are greater than costs.  In this case 
however conservation procurement is costlier implying lower economic efficiency. Since the 
EE metric does not capture this economic scenario we use the economic cost efficiency 
metric (CE) to measure economic performance.  The CE metric measures the outlay 
corresponding to    relative to that for      . This metric is a ratio of two ratios. The 
numerator ratio represents environmental benefit from the stable allocation    relative to the 
total outlay associated with it. The denominator is the corresponding benefit-cost ratio for  
    . Thus with    being the cost of project  , CE can be represented as   
 
            
∑ (    
     
       
 )       
     
   
    
   
∑   
   
  
   
∑      
       
       
               
       
     
   
∑     
    
   
 
          (5) 
For any set of cost and benefit parameters which determines     , higher rent 
seeking is associated with lower CE values.  A value of CE equal to 1 indicates that 
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submitted bids equal costs and the auction is cost efficient.
4
 Finally we also measure seller 
profits or the total Information Rents. This metric captures the degree of competition since 
inter-bidder competition reduces the value of bids submitted and final rents. The metric is 
represented as 
 
       ∑    
       
  
                                      (6) 
Section 3.3: Choice of Experimental Parameters in the Auction 
 We used four sets of cost-benefit parameters for the twelve periods in the auction.  
We assigned parameters to the periods on an ad-hoc basis to prevent ordering effects and to 
ensure that subjects had the chance of winning at least three times if the actual winning 
allocations coincided with the stable allocations considered while choosing the parameters. 
We chose the parameters such that under each group candidate stable allocations    
corresponded to different performance values and spatial configurations and that the full 
information allocation      pertained to a variable number of projects. Let G1 represent 
parameter set 1 and G2 the set 2 so on and so forth. Then for G1, G3 and G4, the full 
information allocation comprised of four projects and for G2, the number was three. 
Considering the candidate stable allocations, under   G1 and G4, four adjacent projects could 
form the stable solution; for G2, the number is three with two adjacent and one isolated 
project and finally under G3 three of the four selected projects could be adjacent to each 
other. We used 350 experimental dollars as the auction budget in all the periods.  The value 
of   was fixed at 50. Table 1 represents the parameters used for the experiment.   
 
                                                     
44
 We note that the value of CE can be greater than 1. This may happen when the bids not selected are very high 
and the budget is insufficient to procure more projects. If the auction ends then a lot of money remains with too 
little conservation procured.  This scenario represents a highly inefficient outcome. 
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INSERT TABLE 1&2 HERE 
Section 3.4: Description of Experimental Procedure 
Experiments were conducted at the Laboratory of Economics, Management and 
Auctions (LEMA) at Penn State University between March and April 2010 using participants 
randomly selected from the Penn State student population. The sessions lasted between an 
hour and an hour and half. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of $7. The exchange rate to 
convert experimental dollars earned during the session to actual dollars was 1 US$ for 15 
experimental dollars. Neutral terminology was used in the instructions. The term QUALITY 
was used to refer to the environmental value and the term ITEM was used to denote a land 
management project. Twelve experimental sessions were conducted with the 6 subjects 
across the computerized interface programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  All the twelve 
paying periods had a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 10 rounds. At the beginning of every 
session a non-paying training period with two rounds was conducted in order to demonstrate 
to the participants how the auction would work. Arbitrary cost-benefit values were used for 
this purpose. Table 2 represents our experimental design.  
During the experiment after subjects submitted bids in a round, the computer 
displayed a results screen showing the submitted bids and the identity of provisional 
winners
5
. In addition as mentioned, all players saw their own score for the current round, 
their bids from the current and past rounds, their costs and the number of neighbors selected 
in the current round. Their cost and previous round's bid were visible to the subjects 
whenever they submitted a bid. Bids were always restricted to be greater than costs and the 
bid from the previous round was automatically submitted in the next round by Z-Tree 
                                                     
5
 Screenshots of the computerized experiment and instructions are provided in the Appendix. 
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(Fischbacher 2007). Subjects could decrease bids by at least 50 experimental cents between 
iterations. The provisional winners in any round became final winners of a period if the 
stopping rules were satisfied. During a session, the identity and location of players on the 
circle remained unchanged.     
Section 4: Results  
We use the experimental data to evaluate mechanism performance at the group level 
and bidding behavior at the individual level. The auction performance analysis indicates the 
negative impact of increased information on the economic performance of the auction.  Next 
using individual level data we are able to postulate whether behavior of subjects at an actual 
auction outcome is consistent with the theoretical properties of a stable allocation. Finally we 
also present an analysis of bidding behavior during the lifetime of the auction.  
Section 4.1: Analysis of Market Performance 
We analyze the auction performance with data from the final round (the binding 
round) of every period.
6
 Figures 1-3 represent the average inter-temporal values of metrics 
across all sessions by treatment. The figures indicate that the value of CE is greater for the 
SCORE sessions relative to NO-SCORE ones except in periods 5 and 12. The rent values are 
found to be higher in all SCORE sessions relative to NO-SCORE sessions as well. However 
we see no significant difference in EE across the treatment. Additionally we observe a 
                                                     
6
We could record data for all the 12 periods of the NO-SCORE sessions and 3 SCORE sessions. For the 
remaining 3 SCORE sessions, the last period was lost owing to software error. Also in some periods, the 
stopping rule was violated owing to a glitch in program and the auction continued for more rounds than it should 
have. Here we applied the stopping rule forcefully to end the auction and did not include the data from 
subsequent rounds in the analysis.  
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negative impact of bidder experience on economic performance (both in terms of CE and 
rents).  
 
INSERT FIGURES 1-3 HERE 
 
We use random effects panel regressions to test the significance of the above results 
with the session representing the random effect. Since the total payments made in different 
periods are different, we use the log of total rents in a session as the dependent variable in the 
analysis. Both the log of total rents and CE metric can have values greater than one. Thus we 
consider a random effects model to analyze the two economic efficiency metrics. However, 
EE cannot have a value greater than 1 by construction so that the ecological effectiveness of 
the auction is analyzed by a random effects tobit model specification. We expect the 
information treatment, experience with bidding (which is captured by the Period variable), 
the number of rounds within any period and the value of benefit-cost parameters to explain 
part of the variation in auction performance. We conjecture that  when subjects know that 
neighbors’ selections influence their own likelihood of selection in   , they will be able to use 
this location based information and the knowledge of  provisional auction outcome (available 
to them via full information feedback) to submit bids which improve both their chances of 
being included in    and earn higher rents.  Thus the information dummy should have a 
negative sign in the analysis of CE and EE and a positive sign for the analysis of rent seeking. 
We include the Period variable in our analysis since familiarity with the auction environment 
(especially in the PES domain where auctions are repeated multiple times) can have a 
significantly negative impact on economic performance by intensifying inter-temporal rent 
seeking. Thus based on our conjecture the estimate for Period should have a negative sign for 
the CE and EE models and a positive sign for the rents regression. We include the Round 
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variable in the analysis to capture the impact of the iterative format on performance. Since we 
are considering a descending price auction the estimate for Round will be negative. Finally, 
since we chose the cost-benefit parameters to obtain different metric values at the candidate 
stable solutions, we expect the dummy variable estimates for the different parameter groups 
to be significantly different relative to the omitted category.   
The regression equation for this analysis is  
 
                                      
(                        
(7) 
Here      is the dependent variable representing the value of the metric for each period 
expressed as a function of the information treatment dummy  , the log of Period   and final 
Round variable    for every period   and the parameter dummies G1 through G3. The log 
specifications for Period and Round provide estimates for growth rates and elasticities.  Group 
G4 and the NO-SCORE treatments represent the omitted categories. We consider G4 as the 
omitted category as the total rents at a candidate stable allocation is the highest under G4 and 
the expected EE is the lowest relative to those which can be obtained under the other 
categories. Since we consider a random effects structure the error term comprises of the 
component    which is the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity associated with every 
session i uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model and the random component 
   .   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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Table 3 presents the regression results for the three metrics. As conjectured, the 
estimate for the information treatment dummy is negative and significant in the CE (at 5%) 
and log of total rents (positive and significant at 5%) models. There is however no significant 
effect of enhanced information on EE. The negative sign for CE suggests that given the 
budget all purchased conservation units are more expensive in the presence of information 
about the spatial goal relative to when this information is absent. The positive estimate in the 
rents regression implies that when subjects know the format of the scoring metric, they 
successfully exploit their locational and cost advantages to retain higher rents (on winning). 
Thus we conclude that increased transparency in the current conservation auction only serves 
to reduce the economic performance of the mechanism without any significant impact on 
ecological effectiveness. This result provides support for careful consideration of the nature 
of information to be revealed to participants in large public conservation auctions which 
function under budget caps.  
The estimate for the log of Period is significant at 5% for the CE and at 1% in the 
rents and at 10% in the EE regression. The negative sign of the estimate in the CE analysis 
represents the reduction in economic performance over time.  This adverse impact of 
experience has policy significance since conservation agencies repeat these auctions over 
multiple years. For example the 41
st
 signup (repetition) of the CRP was implemented in 
months of March and April of 2011 (USDA 2011). Given this repetition induced familiarity 
in the auction, participants can learn to submit higher bids and potentially earn greater rents 
in future signups. Such experience induced rent seeking has in fact been observed under the 
CRP where in later signups landholders were found to be submitting bids near the bid cap – 
the maximum reserve price for a project in an area (Kirwan et al. 2005). Thus conservation 
value procurement gets costly over time. The positive and significant (at 1%) estimate for 
Log of Period in the rents regression has a similar interpretation.  The effect is however 
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inelastic given the iterative descending price nature of the auction whereby rents fall across 
rounds. Experience is also found to have a negative and significant (at 10%) impact on EE 
i.e. the auctions capacity to procure ecosystem services. The negative impact of learning is by 
no means specific to conservation auctions. However the pervasiveness of this impact in the 
current domain regardless of auction features underscores the need for innovative auction 
design to reduce this experience induced rent seeking and reduction in efficiency.  
The log of Round is significant at 10% level in the CE model and at 1% for the rents 
and EE models.  The sign of the estimate is negative for the rents regression and positive for 
the other two as is to be expected given the decreasing price format. Similar results have been 
obtained by Rolfe et al. (2009) in a multi-round iterative auction for rangeland management 
in Australia. In addition, the elasticity estimate in the rents regression is less than one 
indicating that within a period, bidders always try to retain as much rent as possible as they 
reduce the bids submitted between rounds.  This result is true regardless of the information 
content of the auction. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
 We obtain positive and significant estimates for G2 and G3 for the EE model 
implying that environmental performance under these groups is significantly better than 
under G4.  However we find no significant difference in EE between G4 and G1 Table 4 
summarizes the actual values of the metrics from the experiment along with the values at the 
candidate stable allocation used to choose the parameters. We see that there is no significant 
different in the actual mean EE values between G1 and G4 (nearly 0.75). Mean values of the 
EE metric are however greater under both G2 and G3 relative to G4 all else constant. The 
differences in the mean of actual rents in Table 4 suggest significantly different degrees of 
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rent seeking between parameter groups. The negative and significant dummy estimates in the 
rents regression substantiate this result with rents earned under all parameter categories lower 
relative to that under G4. Finally no significant differences emerge in CE between groups 
relative to G4. This result implies that there is no significant difference in the costs of a unit 
of conservation values under different parameter groups relative to the omitted category. This 
result is also supported by the mean values of CE between 0.81 and 0.84 for all groups in the 
sessions.   
Section 4.2: Analysis of Bidding at Final Auction Allocation  
 In Section 2 we have identified the theoretical features of the winning and losing 
bidders at a stable allocation where the auction ends. The main differentiating feature between 
winners and losers is the deviation of their bids from costs. Table 4 also indicates that there is 
not a very big gap between the means of the actual EE and CE values and those at the 
candidate stable allocation the candidate ones used to choose the auction parameters. Thus we 
can conjecture that subject behavior at the final allocations in the experiments is consistent 
with the properties of the stable allocation. In order to formalize this conjecture, we analyze 
bid data from the final round of each auction period in a random effects instrumental variable 
model. Our main thesis here is to examine whether the theoretical difference between winning 
and losing bidders has a counterpart in the experimental data.  For this analysis the dependent 
variable is the markup of bid over costs for every bidder in the final round of all the periods.   
We then control for whether a subject was part of the winning allocation or not in the period 
(we term this variable Winner), agent learning (captured by the reciprocal of the Period 
variable), variation in information content and cost-benefit parameters, and Round values for 
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every period  to explain the variation in the markup data.
7
 The regression equation is 
represented as  
                   
 
 
                  
(                              
(8) 
Here      is the dependent variable representing the markup. It is expressed as a 
function of the treatment dummy  , the learning variable  
 
 
 , the Round variable   , the 
Parameter dummies and the Winner variable   . The error term comprises of the component 
   which is the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity associated with every subject i and 
the random component     .   
 Table 5 represents the set of estimated coefficients for this model. The constant term 
is positive and significant (at 1%).  Of interest to us is the positive and significant estimate (at 
1%) for the Winner variable indicating that winners' markups are significantly higher than the 
losing bidders’ markups. Thus winners’ bids are further away from their costs than those of 
the losing bidders. This indicates significant behavioral differences between winning and 
losing bidders at an actual auction outcome in adherence with the theoretical features of the 
stable allocation. This result is informative for a discussion on the properties of the Nash 
equilibria of the conservation auction. Characterizing the features of an auction outcome on 
the basis of stability feature of Nash equilibrium outcomes is second best and does not 
guarantee that the actual outcome is a Nash equilibrium. However the close correspondence 
                                                     
7
The probability of winning in any round is a function of the bids relative to cost represented by the markup 
value. Again markup earned is a function of whether a subject wins or not. Thus inclusion of the Winner 
variable introduces endogeneity into the regression analysis. Thus we use the value of the winner variable from 
the preceding round as the instrument for the Winner variable for the final round. The correlation coefficient 
between the Winner variable for the final round and the penultimate round for all periods is approximately 0.82 
justifying the use of this instrument.  
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between the theoretical and actual behavior of agents at the final allocation indicates that this 
final allocation and a Nash equilibrium allocation are rightfully aligned.   
 We also obtain a positive and significant (at 5%) estimate for the treatment dummy 
implying that bid markups in the SCORE sessions are higher than in the NO-SCORE 
sessions. Since markups represent individual rents, this result is consistent with our previous 
result on intensified rent seeking in the SCORE sessions. Also the estimates for G1 through 
G3 are negative and significant indicating that on an average markups submitted in periods 
under these groups are lower than those submitted under regime G4. This result is consistent 
with highest value of group level rents under G4 relative to G1 through G3 at the candidate 
stable solution as represented in Table 4.      
 The estimate for Learning is negative and significant (at 5%) indicating that in the 
initial periods where levels of learning are high, markups demanded and earned are lower. 
With greater experience bidders place higher bids and retain more rents in the event of 
winning. The positive trend in the average markup graphs for both SCORE and NO-SCORE 
in Figure 4 substantiates this claim.  This result corresponds to significantly higher rent 
seeking in the latter periods as established in the previous auction performance analysis as 
well. Finally, the sign of the estimate for the Round variable is negative and significant (at 
1%) indicating that a greater number of iterations within a period reduces markups.  
Section 4.3: Bidding Behavior across Multiple Iterations 
In this section we present an analysis of bidding behavior during the lifetime of the 
experimental auction. An interesting feature of iterative auctions is jump bidding. Jump 
bidding entails winning bidders in a round submitting bids in excess of the minimum bid 
decrement in subsequent rounds. Such jump bidding prolongs auctions and reduces the rents 
earned by jump bidders if they win. According to Isaac et al. (2007) bidders despite winning 
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practice such jump bidding early on in the auction and/or persistently from beginning till the 
end, to maintain their competitiveness in the auction even though this might cause them to 
lose some rent. Their theoretical model predicts that the small jumps allow bidders to move 
up to a winning bidding trajectory and stay there such that they can finally win the auction by 
defeating competitors. We use the experimental data from the conservation auction sessions 
to examine the bid decrements across consecutive time periods to identify the prevalence of 
jump bidding.   
For this analysis we compute a composite period-round variable termed date. Table 6 
presents a summary of the bid decrement data for the 72 subjects for all auction dates. We 
classify this data by the information treatment and the winning or losing status of the bidder 
from the previous date. We term the absolute value of the decrement at a date as the jump 
from the previous date. Table 6 presents the jump data. For         there are a total of 
3113 instances of bid reductions.  Of these observations there are 334 instances (for SCORE 
and NO-SCORE sessions) where subjects reduced their bids even if they won in the previous 
date. These 334 instances of bid reductions correspond to jump bidding behavior in our 
auction.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
In order to examine whether the jumps are endemic to our budget constrained 
conservation auction, we consider a random effects tobit analysis with jump variable as the 
dependent variable
8
. We conjecture that the number of neighbors selected in the previous 
                                                     
8
 For the analysis we drop the jump observation for the date corresponding to the first round of a new period. 
This is because a new period corresponds to different parameters and hence a different set of bids which are 
unrelated to the bids submitted at the previous date which corresponds to the final round of the previous period. 
In addition we drop 3 observations which recorded positive jump values owing to software error. These 
observations corresponded to the penultimate round in Period 9 for subjects 61, 62, and 63.To maintain 
consistency and avoid holes in the data set we removed the observations for the next date as well.  
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date, winning status of the player from the previous date, whether the subject had information 
about the format of the scoring metric and the experience with bidding explains the variation 
in the value of the jumps. We also include the parameter dummies to incorporate possible 
impacts of our secondary within treatment.  The regression expression is represented as  
 
                                   [       ]         
(                                
(9) 
Here   is used to represent the date variable which is also the time variable for our 
unbalanced panel with a maximum size of 100. We include the date variable to pick up the 
impact of experience on jump values and the Period dummies to capture any effect at the 
overall Period level
9
.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. The constant term is positive and 
significant (at 1%).  We obtain a negative and significant estimate (at 1%) for the winning 
status of the individual,        from the previous date. Thus holding other variables fixed 
the subject who won in the preceding date implements a smaller decrement than those who 
lost in the preceding date. Thus in our auction, in the majority of cases, bid reducing 
tendencies correspond to losing bidders reducing their bids to win in the next date rather than 
winning bidders reducing bids to maintain their winning positions till the auction terminates. 
This estimate for the date variable is negative and significant (at 1%). One of the reasons for 
jump bidding as the auction proceeds is to maintain competitiveness. However over time 
                                                     
9
 In the analysis owing to inclusion of the parameter dummies, three period dummies are dropped due to multi-
colinearity.  
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familiarity with bidding enables bidders to assess their competitive positions in the auction. 
Given this familiarity, bidders don’t have to implement jumps or they can reduce the value of 
the jumps in the future and still maintain their likelihood of winning.   The estimate for the 
information dummy is positive and significant (at 1%) suggesting that relative to those in the 
NO-SCORE sessions, subjects lower their bids by a greater amount in the SCORE sessions. 
In the SCORE sessions, subjects are aware of the importance of neighbors' selections on their 
own likelihood of winning. Thus relative to NO-SCORE bidders who don't have this 
information, they implement greater bid reductions to enhance or maintain their competitive 
positions and likelihood of selection. The estimate for the number of winning neighbors from 
the previous date is negative and significant (at 10%). Since neighbors’ selection improves a 
subject’s likelihood of selection, greater the number of selected neighbors lower would be the 
bid decrement a subject would implement in the next date. This result seems contradictory to 
our previous explanation regarding the positive information dummy estimate. However we 
note that the observation of the number of winning neighbors from the past date establishes 
the actual competitiveness of a bidder in being selected in the next date. This actual 
competitiveness is different from the competitiveness a bidder perceives to have from 
knowing that their neighbors' selections play a positive role on their own likelihood of 
selection. Finally the positive and significant (at 1%) estimates for G2 through G4 implies 
that there are differences in bid reductions relative to the omitted group – G1. The positive 
signs indicate that relative to G1, greater bid decrements are affected at dates corresponding 
to the remaining parameter categories.  
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Section 5: Conclusion 
The dual objective of ecological and economic efficiency that needs to be pursued in 
the delivery of ecosystem services given fixed budgets provides motivation for the 
development of the conservation auctions literature.  This paper considers the structure of an 
iterative auction for the selection of bids for projects adjacent to each other. Besides 
providing a characterization of an actual conservation auction solution we analyze the impact 
of information about the spatial objective on auction performance. Our main result is that 
greater transparency and inter-temporal learning reduces the economic cost-efficiency of the 
mechanism. Thus this paper sets up the need for more research on conservation auction 
design to formulate a mechanism which will be robust to greater transparency of the 
conservation agency and inter-temporal learning. it is also necessary to explore the nature of 
the Nash Equilibrium that can be obtained in the iterative auction where the number of 
projects are endogenously selected. We also need to consider more complex spatial 
configurations and interactions between adjacent bidders in them since actual landscapes can 
rarely be approximated by circular grids where every landowner has the same number of 
neighbors.  As threats for ES increase, incentive based mechanisms to promote voluntary 
conservation of natural resources is necessary. Additionally, with limited budgets, economic 
efficiency of the incentive mechanisms is a central objective. Thus, policy making needs to 
focus on mechanisms that target various ecological criteria. The current interest in both 
research and policy circles are to explicitly incorporate the spatial criterion into the auctions 
so that it can be attained in an economically efficient manner.  This paper contributes to this 
policy making exercise. 
 
 
 
26 
 
References 
Bartelt, P E.; R..W. Klaver and W. P. Porter. 2010. Modeling amphibian energetics, habitat suitability, 
and movements of western toads, Anaxyrus (=Bufo) boreas, across present and future 
landscapes. Ecological Modeling 221(22), pp. 2675. 
Cason, T. N., L. Gangadharan, and C. Duke. 2003. A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-
point source pollution. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46 (3): 446-71.  
Faith, D. P. (1994). Phylogenetic pattern and the quantification of organismal biodiversity. Phil. 
Trans. R.Soc. Lond. B Vol. 345, pp. 45. 
Fischbacher U. 2007. z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments. Experimental 
Economics 10: 171-178 
Gilpin, M. E. in Viable Populations for Conservation (ed. Soulé, M. E.) pp. 126 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, New York, 1987). 
Gole, C., Burton, M., Williams, K.J., Clayton, F., Faith, D.P., White, B., Huggett, A. and Margules, 
C. (2005). Auction for Landscape Recovery: ID 21 Final report, September 2005. 
Commonwealth Market Based Instruments program, WWF Australia. Available from URL: 
http://www.napswq.gov.au/mbi/round1/project21.html [accessed 18 Aug 2006]. 
Hajkowicz, S., A. Higgins, K. Williams, D. P. Faith, and M. Burton. 2007. Optimisation and the 
selection of conservation contracts*. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 51 (1): 39-56.  
Isaac R.M, T.C. Salmon and A. Zillante. 2007. A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 62: 144-164. 
Kellerer, H., U. Pferschy, and D. Pisinger. 2004. Knapsack problems. Springer Verlag.  
Kirwan, B., R. N. Lubowski, and M. J. Roberts. 2005. How cost-effective are land retirement 
auctions? estimating the difference between payments and willingness to accept in the 
conservation reserve program. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87 (5): 1239.  
McAfee, R. P., and J. McMillan. 1996. Analyzing the airwaves auction. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 10(1): 159-175. 
Parkhurst, G. M., J. F. Shogren, C. Bastian, P. Kivi, J. Donner, and R. B. W. Smith. 2002. 
Agglomeration bonus: An incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity 
conservation. Ecological Economics 41 (2): 305-28.  
Parkhurst, G.M., J.F. Shogren (2007). Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat. Ecological 
Economics, Vol: 64(2), pp.344. 
Plott, C. R. 1997. Laboratory experimental testbeds: Application to the PCS auction. Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 6 (3): 605-38.  
Reeson AF, Rodriguez L, Whitten SM, Williams KJ, Nolles K, Windle J, Rolfe J. 2010. Adapting 
auctions for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale. Ecological Economics 
70:1621-1627. 
27 
 
Rolfe, J., and J. Windle. 2006. Using field experiments to explore the use of multiple bidding rounds 
in conservation auctions. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/25801/1/dp060001.pdf 
Rolfe, J., J. Windle, and J. McCosker. 2009. Testing and implementing the use of multiple bidding 
rounds in conservation auctions: A case study application. Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Agroeconomie 57 (3): 287-303.  
Stoneham, G., V. Chaudhri, A. Ha, and L. Strappazzon. 2003. Auctions for conservation contracts: 
An empirical examination of victoria's BushTender trial. Australian Journal of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics 47 (4): 477-500.  
USDA Conservation Reserve Program signup 41 Factsheet. (2001). 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/crp_41_ebi.pdf 
Willis, E.O. (1979). The composition of avian communities in luminescent woodlots in southern 
Brazil. Papeis Avulsos de Zoologia, Sao Paulo 33, 1–25. 
 
Table  1: Parameters for Experiments 
Budget – $350 
Environmental Benefit from Two Adjacent 
Projects – 50 
 
Periods in which used 
G1 
Benefit 
Cost 
245 
100 
150 
40 
215 
90 
209 
95 
195 
85 
285 
112 
2, 4, 10 
G2 
Benefit 
Cost 
204 
112 
349 
105 
213 
89 
295 
146 
363 
95 
271 
110 
3, 5, 11 
G3 
Benefit 
Cost 
210 
140 
215 
95 
220 
103 
265 
85 
145 
130 
145 
60 
6, 8, 12 
G4 
Benefit 
Cost 
252 
87 
269 
124 
241 
100 
280 
137 
235 
51 
277 
69 
7, 9, 13 
 
Table 2 Experimental Design 
 Treatment 
 SCORE NO-SCORE 
Number of sessions 6 6 
Number of players in a session 6  6  
Number of periods per session 13 (one practice period) 13 (one practice period) 
Maximum number of rounds 10 10 
Minimum number of rounds to 
be played 
5 5 
Payment structure 
$7 show up fee 
Exchange rate – 15 experimental dollars for every 
US $ 
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Table 3 Regression Results for Market Performance 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Economic  
Efficiency 
Log of Rents 
Ecological 
Effectiveness  
 
Estimate 
(Standard Error) 
 
 
Random 
Effects  
Random Effects  
Random Effects 
Tobit 
Constant 
.8060* 
(.046) 
4.8873* 
(.230) 
.5703* 
(.059) 
Information Dummy 
-.0422* 
(.014) 
.1981** 
(.079) 
-.0415 
(.028) 
Ln(Period) 
-.0227** 
(.009) 
.1781* 
(.047) 
-.0207*** 
(.011) 
Ln(Final Round) 
.0380*** 
(.022) 
-.3989* 
(.111) 
.1114* 
(.028) 
G1 
-.0179 
(.019) 
-.5380* 
(.096) 
.0039 
(.023) 
G2 
.0201 
(.017) 
-.7717* 
(.086) 
.1702* 
(.021) 
G3 
-.0011 
(.016) 
-.5137 * 
(.081) 
.0766* 
(.019) 
Number of observations 141 
Number of groups 12 
Panel Variable Session 
*** Represents estimate is significant at 10%, ** represents estimate is significant at 5%, * represents 
estimate is significant at 1%  
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Table 4: Summary of Performance Metrics in Auction by Parameter Group 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Stable 
Allocation 
Ecological 
Effectiveness 
G1 36 0.757 0.09 0.55 0.92 1 
G2 36 0.903 0.12 0.59 1 1 
G3 36 0.8 0.08 0.58 0.94 0.84 
G4 33 0.723 0.06 0.47 0.95 0.72 
Economic 
Cost 
Efficiency 
G1 36 0.819 0.05 0.63 0.91 0.9 
G2 36 0.844 0.07 0.68 0.94 0.78 
G3 36 0.812 0.08 0.66 0.96 0.8 
G4 33 0.812 0.07 0.7 1.02 0.8 
Total  
Information 
Rents 
G1 36 52.12 27.56 7 160.5 35 
G2 36 44.34 18.85 17.5 111 33 
G3 36 59.54 15.65 33 101 35 
G4 33 101.57 25.26 36 141 101 
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Table  5: Estimates (Standard Error) for Average Markup for Final Round  
Dependent Variable : Markup over costs in Final Round of Period 
Dummy 
.061** 
(0.163) 
Winner 
0.179*   
(0.018) 
Learning (1/Period) 
-0.094**   
(0.038) 
Final Round 
-0.017* 
(.004) 
G1 
-0.055*** 
(0.026) 
G2 
-0.156* 
(.023) 
G3 
  -0.115*   
(0.022) 
Constant 
0.324* 
(0.036) 
Number of Observation 846 
Number of Groups 72 
Unit of Observation Individual Subject 
*** Represents estimate is significant at 10%, ** represents estimate is significant at 5%, * represents 
estimate is significant at 1%  
 
 
Table 6: Frequency table for non-zero bid reductions by previous winning status 
and information treatment* 
 SCORE NO-SCORE Total 
Won at past date 281(1257) 153(1213) 334(2470) 
Lost at past date 1413(1587) 2166(1397) 2679(2984) 
Total 1694(2844) 1419(2610) 3113(5454) 
*Figures in brackets indicate total number of observations under each category 
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Table 7: Estimates (Standard Error) for Bid Reductions for all Dates 
Dependent Variable : Bid reduction at a Date 
Winning Status from Previous Date 
-31.96*  
(0.82) 
Winning Neighbors from Previous Date 
-1.05** 
(0.58) 
Dummy 
6.66*  
(2.18) 
Experience 
-0.51* 
(0.08) 
G2 
38.25* 
(6.01) 
G3 
19.05* 
(3.01) 
G4 
32.26* 
(4.78) 
Time2 
-32.39* 
 (5.32) 
Time3 
10.28* 
 (2.00) 
Time4 
-23.55*  
(4.19) 
Time6 
-8.58*  
(2.04) 
Time7 
8.62*  
(1.97) 
Time9 
37.31* 
 (5.32) 
Time11 
26.08* 
 (4.12) 
Time12 
13.55*  
(2.93) 
Constant 
4.91  
(1.94) 
Number of Observation 5448 
Number of Groups 72 
Unit of Observation Individual Subject 
** Represents estimate is significant at 10%, * represents estimate is significant at 1%  
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Figure 1 Average Cost Efficiency by Period
 
Figure 2 Average Log Rents by Period 
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Figure 3 Average Ecological Effectiveness by Period 
 
Figure 4 Markup in Final Round 
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